A fundamental decision for any manufacturer is when to sell to a downstream retailer.
Introduction
A fundamental decision that any …rm faces is when to sell its product. Consider a product where the production lead time is long relative to the selling season and where market demand is stochastic and retail price-dependent. Products that share these characteristics include toys, fashion apparel, and technology products. To ensure that the product is available when the selling season begins, the upstream manufacturer must determine the production quantity well in advanced of the selling season. Consider a manufacturer (he) that sells to a retailer (she) through a linear wholesale price contract. Such contracts are widely used in practice, in large part due to their simplicity. The manufacturer has two alternatives regarding when to sell: (1) The manufacturer can sell in advance of the selling season, i.e., sell early, and push o¤ the demand risk onto the retailer. (2) The manufacturer can sell close to the selling season, i.e., sell late, and bear the demand risk.
Should the manufacturer sell early or late? If market conditions turn out to be strong, then the retailer will be able to set a high retail price and sell a large quantity. Consequently, the late-selling manufacturer will be able to charge a high price to the retailer, and the manufacturer will tend to bene…t from selling late. On the other hand, if market conditions are weak, then the price the late-selling manufacturer will be able to charge the retailer will be relatively low. Further, ex post it may be clear that the manufacturer incurred production costs for units that, given the weak condition of the market, it is not pro…table for the manufacturer to sell. Hence, the manufacturer will tend to do poorly by selling late. On balance which e¤ect should dominate? Under what circumstances would the manufacturer prefer to sell early or late?
To address this issue we propose a simple manufacturer-retailer model in which the …rms are risk neutral and possess the same information, demand occurs once, and production must occur before market uncertainty is resolved. We compare the manufacturer's pro…t when he announces his wholesale price and sells either before or after the market uncertainty is resolved. We show that in considerable generality, the manufacturer's pro…t is greater when he sells late. Provided that the demand curve satis…es relatively mild assumptions, this result holds regardless of the nature and degree of uncertainty in the market, the magnitude of the production cost or the shape of the production cost function, or the existence of salvage opportunities. Further, we provide a readily interpretable necessary and su¢cient condition for when the manufacturer's pro…t is strictly greater: The late-selling manufacturer's pro…t is strictly greater if and only if it is ever pro…table for the late-selling manufacturer to withhold stock from the retailer. A numerical study demonstrates that the pro…t increase can be substantial. We characterize when the manufacturer's gain from selling late comes at the expense of the retailer and when selling late results in a Pareto improvement.
In many contexts, the retailer may possess superior information about demand and/or the retailer may in ‡uence demand by exerting sales e¤ort. We demonstrate that the presence of either factor can make selling early attractive to the manufacturer. We characterize the manufacturer's sale timing preference in context of asymmetric information and the context of retailer sales e¤ort, providing clear conditions under which the manufacturer prefers to sell either early or late.
Restricting attention to the decision to sell either early or late facilitates a comparison between two simple alternatives. This is also in line with industries such as the toy industry where products are frequently either manufactured without any …rm order commitments or produced only to meet …rm orders (Woelbern 2001) . However, a manufacturer may do better by selling at both times. Erhun et al. (2001) examine the pro…t improvement resulting from selling both early and late rather than just early. Anand et al. (2001) show that a manufacturer that sells at two points in time prefers not to commit to a future wholesale price. Gilbert and Cvsa (2000) examine the manufacturer's wholesale price commitment decision and issues related to sale timing when the retailer makes early investments in cost reduction. Our analysis di¤ers in three important ways. First, a crucial aspect of our problem formulation is that the production lead time is long and demand is uncertain; consequently, production must occur before demand uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, Gilbert and Cvsa (2000) assume that production occurs after uncertainty is resolved; consequently, the late-selling manufacturer simply produces to order rather than speculatively building inventory in advance (this remark also applies to Erhun et al. and Anand et al.) . Second, Gilbert and Cvsa assume that the late-buying retailer prices optimally but the early-buying retailer does not (the early-buying retailer always sells her entire quantity due to operational in ‡exibility); we assume optimal behavior throughout. Third, we consider general demand curves, rather than restricting attention to linear demand curves, and information asymmetry.
Other researchers consider contracts that expand the terms of trade beyond the wholesale price. Padmanabhan and Png (1997) examine full credit returns, Emmons and Gilbert (1998) examine partial credit returns, and Cachon and Lariviere (2000) examine revenue sharing. Full credit returns is similar to selling late in that the demand risk resides entirely with the manufacturer. Padmanbhan and Png show that depending on the exogenous parameters, manufacturer pro…t may be higher or lower under full returns. All of the preceding papers suppose that the retail price is endogenous.
In practice, typically market demand is sensitive to the retail price and retailers have substantial discretion in setting retail prices. A retailer's pricing decision depends on her inventory, her ability to purchase additional units (and on what terms) and the state of the market. The manufacturer's wholesale pricing decision, in turn, depends on the retailer's subsequent retail pricing decision (e.g., the price the retailer is willing to pay depends on the price sensitivity of market demand). Consequently, the retailer's role in setting the retail price has important implications for the manufacturer's sale timing decision. Indeed, we demonstrate that the manufacturer's sale timing preference depends critically on the price elasticity of demand. Several papers consider issues related to sale timing when the retail price is instead exogenous: Lariviere and Porteus (2001) examine the early-selling manufacturer's wholesale price decision. Ferguson (2001) and Ferguson et al. (2002) examine the issue of sale timing in a two-…rm supply chain. Assuming that the retail price is exogenous leads to a substantially di¤erent focus and approach. Because in this setting the wholesale-price-setting manufacturer's sale timing preference is straightforward to ascertain, they instead focus on comparing the preferences of the …rms when the wholesale price is set by the retailer, is set by the manufacturer, or is set to equalize the …rms' pro…ts. Our approach di¤ers in that we consider price-sensitive retail demand, sales e¤ort, and asymmetric information. Cachon (2002) identi…es the Pareto set of wholesale price contracts when the manufacturer sells early and/or late.
A number of papers in the supply chain literature consider asymmetric information (e.g., Porteus and Whang 1999 , Cachon and Lariviere 2001 , Corbett 2001 , and Ha 2001 and sales e¤ort e¤ects (e.g., Chu 1992 , Desai and Srinivasan 1995 , and Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997 . Cachon (2001) and Chen (2001) provide comprehensive reviews of the supply chain contracting literature. Van Meighem and Dada (1999) consider a single …rm, rather than a supply chain, and examine the pro…t improvement resulting from postponing price and production decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. §2 presents a model that examines the manufacturer's sale timing decision in a basic setting. §3 explores the setting in which retailer sales e¤ort in ‡uences demand. §4 explores the setting in which information is asymmetric. §5 provides concluding remarks.
Model
Regardless of when the manufacturer sells to the retailer, the sequence of events is as follows: The manufacturer o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it wholesale price contract to the retailer.
The retailer responds by either ordering or rejecting the contract (ordering zero). The manufacturer then ful…lls the order. After market uncertainty is resolved, the retailer sets the retail price and sells to consumers. The retail price when q units are sold in market state » is p(q; »); assumed to be continuous in » and twice di¤erentiable and decreasing in q. The resulting revenue to the retailer is ¼(q; »)´p(q; »)q; assumed to be concave in q.
All functions described as concave, convex, increasing, or decreasing are strictly so. The market state, », is a random variable having mean ¹, distribution ©(¢); and density Á(¢), where Á(») > 0 for » > 0 and Á(») = 0 for » · 0; similar results are obtained when the support is [l; h); where 0 · l < h · +1:
Because the production lead time is long, production must occur before the market state is known. The cost of producing s units is c(s): Assume c(s) is weakly convex in s, the salvage value of unsold units is zero, and ¼ q (q; »)q is concave in q, where the subscript indicates a partial derivative; these assumptions can be relaxed, as discussed below.
Exclude the uninteresting case in which the cost of production is su¢ciently high that the manufacturer's expected pro…t is negative for all positive production quantities; similarly, exclude the case where the cost is su¢ciently low that the manufacturer's pro…t is unbounded. Figure 1 depicts 
Manufacturer Sells Late
This subsection examines the manufacturer that sells close to the selling season. When the manufacturer sells late, the sequence of events is as follows: In Stage 1, the manufacturer determines his production quantity and produces s. In Stage 2, the market state, », is revealed, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, w, and the retailer orders q and sets the retail price, p.
At the end of Stage 2, the retailer faces a known ». The retailer will, of course, only order units she plans to sell. Hence, the retailer's retail pricing and ordering problems collapse into the single problem
where, recall, ¼(q; ») = p(q; »)q: The second order condition for the retailer's pro…t maximization is satis…ed because the retailer's revenue is concave in q. Assume w · ¼ q (0; »);
so that the retailer's optimal order quantityq(w) is the unique solution to the …rst order condition:
At the beginning of Stage 2, the manufacturer's wholesale pricing problem is, given the state of the market » and the quantity s he produced earlier, to choose a wholesale price that maximizes his revenue:
Because there is a one-to-one mapping between the wholesale price and the quantity sold, the manufacturer's wholesale pricing problem can be parameterized as the quantity setting
In Stage 1, the manufacturer's expected pro…t from s units iŝ
and the manufacturer's production problem is 
Manufacturer Sells Early
This subsection examines the manufacturer that sells well in advance of the selling season.
When the manufacturer sells early, the sequence of events is as follows: In Stage 1, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, the retailer orders, and the manufacturer produces and ful…lls the order. In Stage 2, the market state is revealed, and retailer sets the retail price.
In Stage 2, the retailer's pricing problem is, given the state of the market » and the quantity s she purchased earlier, to choose a retail price that maximizes her revenue.
Because there is a one-to-one mapping between the retail price and the quantity sold, the retailer's retail price setting problem can be parameterized as the quantity setting problem
Consequently, in Stage 1 the retailer's expected pro…t when she orders s is
It is easy to check that the second order condition is satis…ed.
so that the retailer's optimal order quantitys(w) is the unique solution to the …rst order condition:
Equation (3) 
Comparison of Selling Early Versus Late
Comparing (2) and (4) directly, it is far from obvious when, if ever, the manufacturer would prefer to sell late. The …rst step in making an analytical comparison is to note that there is a one-to-one mapping between the early-selling manufacturer's wholesale price and the retailer's order quantity (see (3)). Consider the equivalent problem in which the earlyselling manufacturer's wholesale price is parameterized as a function of the retailer's order quantity. The early-selling manufacturer's expected pro…t when he chooses a wholesale price that induces retailer order quantity s is
The manufacturer's problem is
where r(s) denotes the early-buying retailer's expected pro…t when the manufacturer sells s: Let M denote the pro…t of the early-selling manufacturer; recall thatM is the pro…t of the late-selling manufacturer.
Theorem 1 compares the manufacturer's pro…t when he sells early and late.
Theorem 1M¸M
where the inequality is weak if and only if
for all » and all q ·ŝ:
In other words, the manufacturer's expected pro…t is always greater when he sells late. The
Theorem provides a readily interpretable condition which indicates when the late-selling manufacturer's pro…t is strictly greater. Equation (5) holds in the relevant range if and only if it is always optimal for the late-selling manufacturer, regardless of the state of the market, to sell all of the units that he produced earlier to the retailer. The proof of Theorem 1, as well as those of the other main results, is given in the appendix.
Because, by assumption, ¼(q; ») < 0; equation (5) implies
That is, a necessary (but not su¢cient) condition for selling late to have no e¤ect on manufacturer pro…t is that for reasonable stock levels the retailer's revenue is strictly increasing in the number of units she sells. Equation (6) holds if and only if the magnitude of the price elasticity of demand is strictly greater than unity. Equation (5) will tend to hold when the revenue function is both increasing and not too concave.
Equations (5) and (6) yield simple rules of thumb for managers interested in determining whether selling late will strictly increase the manufacturer's expected pro…t. Selling late will strictly increase the manufacturer's expected pro…t if for reasonable stock levels either
(1) it would ever be pro…table for the retailer to withhold stock from consumer market or (2) it would ever be pro…table for the late-selling manufacturer to withhold stock from the retailer.
The manufacturer prefers to sell late because in doing so he is able to exercise greater control. In particular, when the manufacturer sells early he only determines his production quantity. When the manufacturer sells late, he e¤ectively determines both his production quantity and (through his wholesale price decision) the retail price. The early-selling manufacturer sells his entire production quantity. In contrast, the late-selling manufacturer may be able to increase his revenue, at least in some states, by withholding stock from the retailer (setting a higher wholesale price). Because of the advantage conferred to the lateselling manufacturer by the ability to withhold stock, the manufacturer's expected revenue from any given production quantity s is greater when he sells late. Thus, the manufacturer's expected pro…t from s units is greater when he sells late:
Comparing the manufacturer's expected pro…ts under the optimal production quantities yields the result that the manufacturer prefers to sell late:M¸M:
The result that the manufacturer prefers to sell late continues to hold when several of the model's assumptions are relaxed. First, if the assumption that the production cost is convex is relaxed, the result holds becausem(s)¸m(s): Second, if the assumption that the salvage value is zero is relaxed, the result holds. Speci…cally, suppose that when the market state is »; the …rms have the opportunity to dispose of unsold units for a per unit salvage value of v(»); where v(») is continuous in ». Then Theorem 1 holds when equation (5) is replaced by
which holds when it is always pro…table for the late-selling manufacturer to sell his entire stock. This condition will be less likely to hold when v(») is large. That is, the possibility of large salvage values will tend to make selling late strictly better than selling early. Third, if the assumption that ¼ q (q; »)q is concave in q is relaxed, then the statement of Theorem 1 holds when if and only if is replaced by if.
The result that the manufacturer prefers to sell late depends importantly on the assumptions that the manufacturer dictates the terms of trade and that the …rms are risk neutral. Suppose the retailer speci…es the terms of the linear wholesale price contract (and for simplicity suppose the salvage value is zero). Stimulating manufacturer production requires that the retailer commit to the wholesale price in advance. Consequently, both …rms prefer that the retailer buys early. When the manufacturer dictates the terms of trade, his expected pro…t is greater when he sells late. However, in moving to selling late he introduces variability in his pro…t. If the manufacturer is su¢ciently risk averse, the manufacturer may prefer to sell early.
Finally, observe that the retailer either prefers to buy early or is indi¤erent to the timing of her purchase. Thus, the manufacturer's gain in selling late rather than early may or may not come at the expense of the retailer. At the end of this subsection, we consider a speci…c setting and characterize when each outcome occurs.
Examples. Every p(q; ») corresponds to a demand function D(p; »), where D(p; »)
is the quantity demanded under price p in market state ». A common approach is to assume that the demand is stochastic in an additive or multiplicative fashion, i.e., D(p; ») =
where y(p) is a deterministic, downward sloping demand curve.
Commonly used forms of y(p) in economics are
where a > 0 and b > 0 for (7) and (8) and a > 0 and b > 1 for (9) (Petruzzi and Dada 2002) .
We consider the multiplicative model for (7) - (9) and the additive model for (7). (The additive model for (8) and (9) is unrealistic because as p ! 1; D(p; ») ! »; and hence for any positive » and stock level, the retailer's pro…t is unbounded). It is easy to check that for the multiplicative model for (7) and (8) that equation (5) does not hold for all »: Hence, for the multiplicative linear and exponential demand cases it is always pro…table for the manufacturer to withhold stock from the retailer when the market conditions are su¢ciently weak, and consequently the manufacturer does strictly better by selling late.
In contrast, for the multiplicative model for (9), equation (5) (and consequently (6)) holds for all (»; q): Hence, for the power demand case it is always pro…table, regardless of the state of the market, for both the late-selling manufacturer and the retailer to sell their entire stock to the their downstream customer(s). Consequently, the manufacturer's expected pro…t is no di¤erent if she sells early or late.
Finally, consider the additive model for (7) where the production cost is linear, i.e., That is, the manufacturer does strictly better by selling late only if the production cost is su¢ciently small. To see why this holds, note that (5) holds for all » only if q · a=4: When the production cost is large, the optimal production quantity is su¢ciently small that it is always optimal for the late-selling manufacturer to sell all the units he produced. Conversely, if the production cost is small, then the production quantity is su¢ciently large that it is optimal for the manufacturer to withhold stock when market conditions are poor. Similar results apply for the multiplicative model for (7) and (8) when Á(») has support [l; 1) where
The intuition that inexpensive production may make withholding stock attractive to the late-selling manufacturer is quite general. To the extent that inexpensive production makes it attractive for the late-selling manufacturer to ever withhold stock, inexpensive production is associated with the manufacturer doing strictly better by selling late. This result is consistent with Padmanbhan and Png's (1997) …nding that low production cost favors full returns, where the demand risk is borne by the manufacturer. Because full returns is equivalent to selling late at a precommitted price where the manufacturer promises to meet any order, selling late is superior to full returns. This helps to explain why although no returns may be superior to full returns, selling late is always better than selling early.
To assess the magnitude of the impact of sale timing on the …rms, we conduct a numerical study. Assume that the demand curve is
and that the production cost is linear; » can be interpreted as the size of the market.
Suppose that » is a Normal(¹; ¾ 2 ) random variable, truncated such that its probability mass is distributed over »¸0. De…ne ¢ m´(M ¡ M)=M; i.e., ¢ m is the relative change in pro…t to the manufacturer due to selling late. Let ¢ r and ¢ t denote the analogous quantities for the retailer and total system. Consider the 80 problems de…ned by the following parameters: b = f1=2; 1g; c = f0; 1; 2; 3g; ¹ = f5; 10g; and ¾ = f1; 3; 5; 7; 9g: Table 1 reports the impact of sale timing on the pro…ts of the …rms. First, ¢ m and ¢ t are increasing in ¾ and decreasing in c: That is, the manufacturer's (and total system's) pro…t increase from selling late tends to be larger when the market size is highly variable and the production cost is low. Thus, manufacturers of innovative products with low marginal production costs (e.g., software, recorded music) may particularly bene…t by selling close to rather than in advance of the selling season. Second, the late-buying retailer's pro…t is indi¤erent to the timing of the sale if and only if ¾ is su¢ciently small.
That is, if the market size is highly variable, then the retailer is better o¤ buying early.
Conversely, small market size variability ensures that the manufacturer bene…ts and the retailer is not hurt the manufacturer's selling late. This suggests that for products where the market size is fairly well known, selling late rather than early results in a Pareto dominant outcome.
Theorem 1 states that in considerable generality the manufacturer is better o¤ selling late rather than early. The next section examines the extent to which this result continues to hold when the retailer exerts sales e¤ort. Consequently, the retailer's sales revenue when she exerts e¤ort e and sells q units is ¦(e; q; ») = (e + » ¡ q)q=b: Assume that e¤ort is costly and investments in sales e¤ort have no value outside the manufacturer-retailer relationship. Because the analysis of sales e¤ort during the selling season is more straightforward, we consider it …rst.
Retailer Sales E¤ort

Sales E¤ort in Stage 2
This subsection examines the sale timing decision when the retailer exerts sales e¤ort during the selling season, i.e., in Stage 2. The sequence of events follows that described in §2 with the single modi…cation that in Stage 2, when the retailer sets her retail price, she also sets her e¤ort level.
Although the introduction of retailer sales e¤ort may appear to represent a signi…cant change in the problem setting, we show that under relatively mild assumptions, the essential aspects of the sale timing issue are unchanged and hence the results carry through from the previous section. This insight stems from the fact that regardless of whether the manufacturer sells early or late, the retailer determines her e¤ort level after the manufacturer sets his wholesale price. The retailer's e¤ort decision is relevant to the manufacturer only in that it in ‡uences the retailer's order quantity. The retailer's order quantity depends fundamentally on the revenue generated by a given quantity, and accordingly, we focus on this quantity. Assume the cost of e¤ort, V (e); is increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and satis…es
; for technical convenience assume P (» = 1) = 0 almost surely. Recall that ¦(e; q; ») is the retailer's sales revenue when she exerts e¤ort e and sells q units. The retailer's revenue net of the e¤ort cost in market state » when she sells q units and exerts the optimal e¤ort level is
Because the e¤ort cost is convex and lim e!1 V e (e) = 1, there exists a unique optimal e¤ort level for any quantity. It is straightforward to show that V ee (e) > (2b)
is concave in q and ¼ q (1; ») · 0 almost surely; this ensures that the manufacturer's pro…t is …nite. Consequently, the quantity and e¤ort problem reduces to a quantity-only problem of the type studied in §2. Thus, the result from §2 that the manufacturer prefers to sell late extends to the case in which the retailer exerts sales e¤ort during the selling season.
In the next subsection we observe that the retailer's e¤ort decision depends importantly on whether the manufacturer's wholesale pricing decision precedes the retailer's e¤ort decision. When the retailer exerts sales e¤ort during the selling season, the temporal ordering of these decisions does not depend on the manufacturer's sale timing. In contrast, when the retailer exerts sales e¤ort prior to the selling season, the temporal ordering of these decisions does depend on the sale timing; this leads to sharply di¤erent results for the manufacturer's sale timing preference.
Sales E¤ort in Stage 1
This subsection examines the sale timing decision when the retailer exerts sales e¤ort prior to the selling season, i.e., in Stage 1. The sequence of events follows that described in §2 with the single modi…cation that the retailer exerts e¤ort prior to the revelation of ». Assume that V (e) = ®e 2 ; ® can be interpreted as the costliness of e¤ort. To ensure that e¤ort is su¢ciently costly that the retailer's pro…ts are not unbounded, assume ® > (4b) ¡1 : Assume that the production cost is linear and that » = L with probability¸and » = H otherwise, where L < H: Chu (1992), Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) , and Padmanabhan and Png (1997) assume similar two-point distributions with linear demand curves.
Consider the late-selling manufacturer. In Stage 1, the retailer chooses her e¤ort level and the manufacturer determines his production quantity. Rather than allow the …rms to randomize over their decisions, we restrict attention to pure strategies. In Stage 2, the retailer's ordering and retail price problem can be parameterized as the quantity problem
f¦(e; q; ») ¡ wqg :
Given the retailer's optimal order quantity, the manufacturer's wholesale pricing problem at The manufacturer's production quantity and the retailer's sales e¤ort constitute a Nash equilibrium ifŝ Lemma 1 When the manufacturer sells late, the unique Nash equilibrium in the manufacturer's production quantity and the retailer's e¤ort is
;¸L 16®b¡¸´i f c <ĉ;
if c <ĉ;
if c >ĉ.
Consider the early-selling manufacturer. In Stage 1, the retailer chooses her order quantity and e¤ort level. In Stage 2, the retailer's retail price problem can be parameterized as the quantity problem Given the retailer's optimal order quantity as a function of the wholesale price, the earlyselling manufacturer's wholesale pricing problem at the beginning of Stage 1 is (4). Let e ¤ denote the retailer's e¤ort when the manufacturer sells early. As before, let M denote the early-selling manufacturer's expected pro…t, R(w) the early-buying retailer's expected pro…t under wholesale price w; andR the late-buying retailer's expected pro…t. To obtain analytical results it is convenient to consider the relaxed problem
in which the constraint R(w)¸R; which ensures the retailer's participation, is ignored.
Lemma 2 Consider the early-selling manufacturer's relaxed problem (12).
(a) The manufacturer's pro…t is
and the retailer's e¤ort is Clearly the manufacturer's pro…t is a function of the retailer's e¤ort level, with manufacturer pro…t increasing in the e¤ort. To gain insight into whether the manufacturer is better o¤ selling early or late, …rst consider how the timing of the manufacturer's sale in ‡uences the retailer's e¤ort investment. When the manufacturer sells late, he sets the wholesale price after the retailer chooses her e¤ort level. Anticipating that the manufacturer will charge a high wholesale price when she exerts a high level of e¤ort, the retailer instead chooses a lower e¤ort level. This is the celebrated hold-up problem: Anticipating that ex post the manufacturer will appropriate the gains associated with the retailer's ex ante relationship-speci…c investment in sales e¤ort, the retailer underinvests. Indeed, equation (11) demonstrates that the if the production cost is su¢ciently high, the retailer's incentive to invest is eliminated entirely.
In contrast, when the manufacturer sells early, he sets the wholesale price before the retailer chooses her e¤ort level. Here the e¤ect of the hold-up problem is mitigated because the manufacturer commits to the terms of trade prior to the retailer's relationship-speci…c investment. Indeed, comparing (11) and (13) one can verify thatê < e 0 ; which implieŝ e < e ¤ : That is, the retailer invests less in sales e¤ort when the manufacturer sells late.
Because the manufacturer's pro…t is increasing in the retailer's e¤ort, this suggests that by alleviating the hold-up problem, selling early may result in higher pro…t to the manufacturer.
Theorem 2 formalizes this intuition.
Theorem 2 If c <ĉ; then there exist ¹ ® and ® such that ¹ ®¸® > (4b)
Theorem 2 demonstrates that the manufacturer's sale timing preference depends on the costliness of sales e¤ort and production. First consider the case where the production cost is low. If sales e¤ort is su¢ciently cost e¤ective, the manufacturer prefers to sell early; if sales e¤ort is expensive, the manufacturer prefers to sell late. The intuition is that for any …xed e¤ort level, the manufacturer prefers to sell late because of the advantage conferred by the ability to withhold a portion of the stock (Theorem 1). However, if the manufacturer sets the wholesale price after the retailer's e¤ort decision, then, as discussed above, the retailer will underinvest in e¤ort. Hence, there is a trade-o¤ to the manufacturer in selling late between the advantage conferred by the ability to withhold stock and the disadvantage from undermining the retailer's incentive to invest in sales e¤ort. If e¤ort is cheap, then the impact of e¤ort on pro…t will be large, and consequently, the disadvantage from underinvestment will dominate. Conversely, if e¤ort is expensive, then its e¤ect will be small, whether the retailer sells early or late. Consequently, the disadvantage resulting from underinvestment will be outweighed by the advantage from the ability to withhold stock.
If the production cost is high, then the manufacturer is strictly better o¤ selling early.
The intuition is that when the production cost is su¢ciently high, the retailer anticipates that the late-selling manufacturer will price to sell out regardless of the realization of the market condition. In this case, the manufacturer captures all the gains from retailer e¤ort, and anticipating this, the retailer invests nothing in sales e¤ort (equation (11)). On the contrary, when the manufacturer sells early, the hold-up problem is alleviated, resulting in greater pro…t for the manufacturer. In a distinct, but related setting, Gilbert and Cvsa (2000) …nd that the manufacturer that produces and sells late prefers to commit to the wholesale price in advance when demand uncertainty is low. The next section returns to the no sales e¤ort case and examines the manufacturer's sale timing decision when the parties are asymmetrically informed.
Asymmetric Information
In many contexts, the manufacturer and retailer may have access to di¤erent information.
For example, because the manufacturer is closer to the production process, it is plausible that the manufacturer is better informed about the cost of production. Because the retailer is closer to consumers, it is plausible that the retailer is better informed about the demand 
Information Asymmetry in Stage 1
This subsection addresses information asymmetry well in advance of the selling season. Consider the linear demand model of (10) and assume that » follows the two-point distribution described in §3.2. Assume the production cost is linear. We modify the informational assumptions of §2 by making a single change. As before, both …rms know the distribution of information is to allow the contract designer to o¤er a menu of "screening" contracts. In our setting an uninformed manufacturer can, by properly structuring a menu of nonlinear contracts, induce retailers that observe di¤erent market signals to select di¤erent contracts.
To capture the possibility of screening, suppose the manufacturer is able to o¤er a menu of price-quantity contracts; under the price-quantity contract (k; q) the retailer pays k to purchase q units. As before, assume that the manufacturer o¤ers contracts only once, either at the beginning of Stage 1 or Stage 2.
Consider the late-selling manufacturer. Observe that no informational asymmetry exists at the time the manufacturer o¤ers the contracts. To motivate the manufacturer's optimal decisions, consider the integrated system of manufacturer and retailer when the retailer observes no signal in Stage 1. Suppose that the manufacturer sets his production quantity equal to the optimal production quantity of integrated system; after observing the market state, the manufacturer o¤ers a price-quantity contract in which the quantity is the optimal selling quantity for the integrated system and the price is the resulting revenue for the retailer. By doing so, the manufacturer maximizes the pro…t of the total system, where the retailer's Stage 1 information is ignored, and appropriates it entirely. Clearly, the late-selling manufacturer can do no better.
Consider the early-selling manufacturer. Suppose the early-selling manufacturer o¤ers the menu of contracts (k¹ » ; q¹ » ); ¹ » = fL; Hg; where (k¹ » ; q¹ » ) is intended for the retailer that has observed ¹ ». Bayes' rule implies that ¹ » = L with probability Ã´(µ +¸¡ 1)=(2µ ¡ 1) and ¹ » = H otherwise. The manufacturer's problem can be written as
where r( ¹ »; k; q) is the expected pro…t of the retailer that has observed signal ¹ » under contract (k; q): Because the late-buying retailer's pro…t is zero, (14) and (15) ensure the retailer's participation in buying early. (16) and (17) ensure that the retailer selects the intended contract. Consider the relaxed problem that includes (14) and (16) and excludes (15) and (17). It is straightforward to show that in the relaxed problem (14) and (16) must bind; further, the solution to the relaxed problem satis…es (15) and (17). De…ne ¡(q; »)( » ¡ min(q; »=2)) min(q; »=2)=b and Z´µ(3 +¸¡ 3µ) ¡ 1; ¡(q; ») is retailer's revenue in market state » when she has q units and sets her retail price optimally.
Lemma 3 The early-selling manufacturer's optimal menu of contracts is
The manufacturer o¤ers a high-price, high-quantity contract and a low-price, low-quantity
The expected pro…t of the low-type retailer (i.e., the retailer that observed signal L) is zero while the expected pro…t of the high-type is positive, i.e., the high-type retailer captures information rents. Assuming c < [µH+(1¡µ)L]=b ensures that the manufacturer's expected pro…t is positive. When the retailer has observed the high demand signal, the quantity the manufacturer produces, q H , is the optimal production quantity of the integrated system. However, when the retailer has observed the low demand signal, the quantity that the retailer produces, q L , is less than the optimal production quantity of the integrated channel: The manufacturer's optimal contract distorts the production quantity downward to ameliorate the costs of asymmetric information. Observe that if the production cost is su¢ciently high, the manufacturer only o¤ers a contract to the high-type retailer.
Theorem 3 demonstrates the manufacturer's sale timing preference depends importantly on the cost of production. As before, let M andM be the early-and late-selling manufacturer's pro…t.
Theorem 3 There exist ¹ c and c such that ¹ c¸c > 0; if c < c; then
In other words, if production is inexpensive, the manufacturer prefers to sell late; if production is costly, the manufacturer prefers to sell early. Selling early with a menu of contracts allows the manufacturer to make production decisions with better information about market demand. However, eliciting this information from the retailer is costly to the manufacturer.
If the production cost is high, then knowledge of the signal of market demand at the time of production is of signi…cant value to the manufacturer. This value outweighs the cost of eliciting the information, and the manufacturer prefers to sell early. Conversely, if the production cost is low, then knowledge of the market signal at the time of production is of little value to the manufacturer and consequently, the manufacturer prefers to sell late.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, indeed, one motivation for selling well in advance of the selling season is to obtain better information about market demand. In the ski-apparel industry, well in advance of the selling season retailers often possess better information about demand than the manufacturer. With the explicit objective of eliciting this information from its retailers, apparel manufacturer Sport Obermeyer initiated its Early Write program in which is sells to retailers well (8 months) in advance of the selling season (Fisher et al. 1994 ). (Sport Obermeyer also sells to retailers subsequent to the Early Write program.)
We conclude this subsection by commenting on the sensitivity of the …rms' pro…ts to the quality of the retailer's early information about demand when the manufacturer sells early (when the manufacturer sells late, the …rms' pro…ts are una¤ected by the retailer's early demand information). Recall that µ denotes the accuracy of the signal the retailer observes and hence is a measure of the quality of the retailer's information. If µ = max(¸; 1 ¡¸);
then the signal provides no information and we say that the retailer is uninformed; if µ > max(¸; 1 ¡¸); then the retailer is informed. It is easy to check that the expected pro…t of the early-and late-selling manufacturer are identical when the retailer is uninformed. Thus, an immediate implication of Theorem 3 is that the early-selling manufacturer prefers to sell to an uninformed (informed) retailer if the production cost is low (high). The intuition is similar to the reasoning described above: If the retailer is informed, the manufacturer can make production decisions with better information about market demand. However, selling to an informed retailer puts the manufacturer at a relative informational disadvantage; the manufacturer must cede rents to the retailer to ensure the retailer's participation. As before, if the production cost is low, then the value of knowing the market signal at the time of production is of little value relative to the cost of eliciting the information from an informed retailer; consequently, the manufacturer prefers to sell to an uninformed retailer.
While the uninformed retailer's pro…t is zero, the informed retailer's expected pro…t is positive: she collects information rents. However, the retailer's expected pro…t need not be monotone in the quality of her information µ: That is, in some cases, the retailer is better o¤ with worse information. By investing in forecasting, test marketing, etc. retailers can improve the quality of their (private) information about market demand well in advance of the selling season. This result suggests that retailers should be wary in making such investments:
better information can lead to lower expected pro…t. This holds because the manufacturer in designing the contractual terms takes into account the quality of the retailer's private information.
Similarly, neither the manufacturer's nor the total system's expected pro…t is necessarily monotone in the quality of the retailer's information. The total system may be hurt by the retailer's having better information. Further, manufacturers should not blindly seek out retailers that have strong forecasting capabilities. Given a choice between two informed retailers, the manufacturer sometimes prefers to sell to the retailer with better information (higher µ) and sometimes prefers to sell to the retailer with worse information.
Information Asymmetry in Stage 2
This subsection examines the sale timing decision when the retailer has superior information about demand early in the selling season, i.e., in Stage 2. Again we modify the informational assumptions of §2 by making a single change. As before, in Stage 1 both …rms know the distribution of »; and in Stage 2 the retailer knows the realization of »: To capture that the manufacturer has worse information early in the selling season, assume that in Stage 2 the manufacturer learns the realization of » with probability°; where°2 [0; 1); otherwise, he does not know its realization.
Consider the late-selling manufacturer. The manufacturer produces in Stage 1. At the beginning of Stage 2, the manufacturer o¤ers a menu of price-quantity contracts. With probability°; the manufacturer knows »: The manufacturer maximizes his revenue by o¤ering a single contract where q is equal to the optimal sales quantity of the integrated system of manufacturer and retailer and k is equal to the resulting retailer's revenue. With probability 1 ¡°; the manufacturer does not know the realization of »: By properly structuring a menu of nonlinear contracts, the manufacturer can induce retailers that observe di¤erent market states to select di¤erent contracts. The optimal menu of contracts will depend on the demand function D(p; ») and the distribution of the market state random variable »: The approach in deriving the optimal menu of contracts follows that outlined in §4.1. As in §4.1, information asymmetry typically results in quantity distortion: in at least some states, the manufacturer sells less than the optimal quantity of the integrated channel. Consequently, when the manufacturer sells late, the total system pro…t is less than that of the integrated system.
Consider the early-selling manufacturer. By setting q equal to the optimal production quantity of integrated system and setting k equal to the the late-buying retailer's expected pro…t, the early-selling manufacturer maximizes the pro…t of the combined system and appropriates the maximum possible pro…t. Clearly, this exceeds the late-selling manufacturer's expected pro…t. Thus, when the retailer has superior information about demand early in the selling season, the manufacturer prefers to sell early. When the manufacturer sells late, he is at an informational disadvantage relative to the retailer. In contrast, when the manufacturer sells early, the retailer's informational advantage is eliminated, resulting in greater pro…t for the manufacturer.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to provide guidance to the manufacturer that is addressing the fundamental decision of when he should sell his product. We provide clear guidance in a variety of settings as to when the manufacturer should sell well in advance of the selling season (early) and when he should sell close to the selling season (late). When information is symmetric and retailer sales e¤ort is unimportant, the manufacturer's pro…t is greater when he sells late. Further, the late-selling manufacturer's pro…t is strictly greater if and only if it is ever pro…table for the late-selling manufacturer to withhold stock from the retailer. This will tend to hold when consumer demand is relatively price inelastic, production is inexpensive, and/or the salvage value is high. Numerical results suggest that the manufacturer's pro…t increase tends to be large when production is inexpensive and the market size variability is high.
The result that the manufacturer prefers to sell late extends to when retailer exerts sales e¤ort during the selling season. However, when retailer exerts e¤ort in advance of the selling season, selling late introduces a hold-up problem. Hence, if e¤ort is su¢ciently cheap (or the production cost is su¢ciently high), then the manufacturer prefers to sell early. The result that the manufacturer prefers to sell late extends to the case where the retailer has superior information about demand prior to the selling season, provided that the production cost is low. If the production cost is high or if alternately information asymmetry is present early in the selling season, then the manufacturer prefers to sell early.
A theme that cuts across the various settings is that low production costs tend to make selling late attractive. Conversely, when selling early is attractive, production costs tend to be high. The intuition is that selling late is attractive when the late-selling manufacturer has wide latitude in pricing in response to market conditions. High production costs make speculative production uneconomical for the late-selling manufacturer, constraining his subsequent pricing decision and limiting his pro…t. In contrast, low production costs translate into wide ‡exibility in pricing for the late-selling manufacturer. Although we have restricted attention to a single manufacturer and retailer, the issue of sale timing is important when there are multiple, perhaps competing, manufacturers and retailers; this may be a promising direction for future research.
With a little e¤ort on can verify that if (5) holds for all » and all q ·ŝ; thenm(ŝ) = m(ŝ) and r(ŝ) =R: Thus, M¸m(ŝ) =M:
Proof of Lemma 1: The retailer's optimal order quantity isq(w) = (e + » ¡ bw)=2: At the beginning of Stage 2, the manufacturer's wholesale pricing problem is (1). Because it is nonoptimal for the manufacturer to sell more than (e + H)=4 units, restrict attention to s · (e + H)=4: Clearly, if » = H; then the manufacturer will price to sell out (otherwise the manufacturer could have increased his pro…t by producing a smaller quantity). If It is straightforward to show that the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is thenM ¡ M is weakly convex in c:
